[unredact.tools]

Files that gave people away.

Every one of these was a file someone shared on purpose. What it revealed was an accident. Drop a file below to check yours before you send it.

Drop files here or click to choose

JPEG · PNG · HEIC · WebP · TIFF · PDF · DOCX · XLSX · PPTX · MP4 · MOV · MP3 · text

Files are processed in a temporary folder that is deleted before the response is sent. Nothing is stored or logged. The only thing kept is a running count of files checked and cleaned, with no details about any of them. For anything truly sensitive, run it yourself: pip install "unredact-tools[web]" && unredact.tools web

2005 · A military report on an Italian agent's death

The US military published its report on the death of Italian intelligence officer Nicola Calipari, shot at a checkpoint in Iraq, as a PDF with passages blacked out. Readers found that selecting and copying the text revealed the blacked-out passages, including names and details about the checkpoint.

What would have caught it: the redaction check finds text under black boxes and lists the words beneath. Check a PDF redaction.

2009 · The TSA's screening manual

The Transportation Security Administration posted a version of its airport screening procedures online with sensitive sections covered by black boxes. The text underneath was still in the file and was quickly copied out and shared.

What would have caught it: the same check. Rebuilding the PDF from images would have left nothing under the boxes to copy.

2012 · John McAfee's location

While McAfee was avoiding authorities in Central America, journalists who were with him published a photo of him. The photo still had its GPS coordinates in the EXIF data, which put him in Guatemala.

What would have caught it: the photo scan shows GPS coordinates with a map link, and cleaning rebuilds the image without them. Remove the location from a photo.

2017 · A leaked NSA document

A news site published a scan of a leaked NSA document. The scan still showed the faint yellow tracking dots many color printers add to every page. Decoded, they gave the printer's serial number and the date and time the page was printed.

What would have caught it: the scan looks for printer tracking dots in images and scanned PDFs, decodes common patterns, and removes them when cleaning.

2019 · Paul Manafort's court filing

Manafort's lawyers filed a document with black boxes over sections that were meant to stay sealed. The text under the boxes was still in the PDF. Reporters copied it out and learned he was accused of sharing campaign polling data with an associate.

What would have caught it: the redaction check, before filing. Check a PDF redaction.

The pattern

None of these files were hacked. Each was shared on purpose by someone who looked at it and saw nothing wrong, because what gave them away was never on screen. The only reliable fix is to check the file itself, then send a copy rebuilt from what you can see.

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